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Abstract 
In this paper, we proposed an authentication method according to 
Diffie-Hellman. First, we introduce different methods for 
authentication in IEEE.802.16 then we proposed an 
authentication method according to Diffie-Hellman and in the 
last we compare different methods for authentication to improve 
security in IEEE802.16e. CPN is a useful for simulation and 
compare protocol together so we use CPN tools in this paper.. 
Keywords: wimax, authentication, color petri net, pkm, diffie 
hellman. 
1. Introduction 
The importance of IEEE 802.16, Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (Wimax) is 
growing and will complete with technologies such as 3G. 
The acceptance and adoption of technologies also depend 
on security. IEEE 802.16 Wimax standard consists of a 
protocol stack with well-defined interfaces. The Wimax 
protocol layer contains MAC layer and PHY layer. MAC 
layer includes three sub-layers contain of: The Service 
Specific Convergence Sub-layer (MAC CS), the MAC 
Common Part Sub-layer (MAC CPS) and the Security 
Sub-layer or Privacy Sub-layer. The former IEEE 802.16 
standards used the Privacy and Key Management (PKM) 
protocol which had many critical drawbacks. In IEEE 
802.16e, a new version of this protocol called PKMv2 is 
released. The authentication and key management 
protocols are specified in the security sub layer of IEEE 
802.16 standard. The security sub layer is meant to 
provide subscribers with privacy and authentication and 
operators with strong protection from theft of service. 
Authentication options are: unilateral authentication, 
mutual authentication and no authentication sections IEEE 
S02.16e-2005 standard states that PKM has two versions 
PKMvl and PKMv2, and it allows for four types of 
authentication”:  
 A.RSA base authentication-PKI system(public key 
infrastructure). 
 EAP based authentication (optional). 
 RSA based authentication followed by EAP 
authentication. 
 Diffie Hellman base authentication.  
2. RSA Base authentication protocol 
2.1 Pkmv1 Authentication Protocol 
SS uses Message 1, formally named as the Authentication 
Information Message, to push its X.509 certificate which 
identifies its manufacturer to BS. BS uses this certificate 
to decide whether SS is a trusted device. BS may use this 
message in order to allow access only to devices from 
recognized manufacturers, according to its security policy. 
SS sends Message 2, named as the Authorization Request 
immediately after Message 1(figure.1). Message 2 consists 
of SS’s X.509 certificate with the SS public key, its 
security capabilities which are actually the authentication 
and encryption algorithms that SS support, and the 
security association identity (SAID) which is the id of the 
secure link between SS and BS. Using the certificate, BS 
determines whether to authorize SS; and the public key of 
SS which is also in the certificate lets BS construct 
Message 3 [1]. If successful, namely SS is authorized after 
BS verifies its certificate, BS responds with Message 3, 
the Authorization Reply. This message includes the AK, 
encrypted using the RSA public-key encryption protocol 
using the public-key of SS which was obtained in the 
previous message, the lifetime of the AK as a 32-bit 
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unsigned number in unit of seconds, the sequence number 
for AK as a 4-bit value and the list of SA descriptors each 
including an SAID and the SA cipher suit [1]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 pkmv1 authentication protocol. 
2.2  Pkmv2 Authentication Protocol 
The latest standard, IEEE 802.16e-2005, includes a new 
version (PKMv2) of the protocol that caters for the 
shortcomings of the first version. PKMv2 supports two 
different mechanisms for authentication: the SS and the 
BS may use RSA-based authentication or Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) -based authentication. We 
will focus in this paper on RSA based authentication for 
PKMv2 authentication protocol. The flow of messages 
exchange in RSA-based authentication is shown as 
follows(figure.2): The SS initiates the RSA-based mutual  
authentication process by sending two messages. The first 
message contains the manufacturer X.509 certificate. The 
second, authorization request message, contains the SS’s 
X.509 certificate, 64-bit SS random number Ns, list of 
security capabilities that the SS supports, the SAID and 
the SS signature. If the SS is authenticated and authorized 
to join the network, the BS sends an authorization reply 
message. In the response message, the BS includes the 64-
bit SS random number Ns received, its own 64-bit random 
number Nb, a 256-bit key pre-primary authorization key 
(pre-PAK) encrypted with the SS’s public key, the pre-
PAK key lifetime and its sequence number, a list of 
SAIDs (one or more), the BS’s X.509 certificate and BS’s 
signature in the authorization reply. The SS verifies 
liveness by  comparing the Ns it sent with the received Ns 
in the authorization response message. It then extracts the 
PAK, because only the authorized SS can extract the PAK. 
This can be used as a proof of authorization. Finally, the 
last message of this authentication is send by the SS to 
confirm the authentication of the BS. The SS includes the 
BS random number Nb received in the authorization 
response message, used to proof liveness, the SS’s MAC 
address and a cryptographic checksum of the message. At 
the end of the RSA authorization exchange, both SS and 
BS are authenticated by each other [5]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 pkmv2 authentication protocol. 
 
 
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is an 
authentication framework that is widely used in 
WiFi/802.11 and Wimax/ 802.16 wireless networks. EAP 
is a basis to transfer authentication information between a 
client and a network. It provides a basic  request/response 
protocol framework over which to implement a specific 
authentication algorithm, so called EAP method. 
Commonly used EAP methods are EAP-MD5, EAPLEAP, 
EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP. Within the EAP 
framework, three entities are involved in the 
authentication process: Supplicant, Authenticator, and 
Authentication Server. The supplicant is a user that is 
trying to access the network. It is also known as the peer. 
The authenticator is an access point (AP) that is requiring 
EAP authentication prior to granting access to a network. 
It provides users a point of entry into the network. The 
authentication server (AS) is the entity that negotiates the 
use of a specific EAP method with an EAP supplicant, 
then validates the supplicant, and authorizes access to the 
network. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 EAP TLS base authentication. 
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 Typically, the supplicant is a mobile station (MS) and the 
authentication server is a Remote Authentication Dial-In 
User Service (RADIUS.Figure.3 shows the brief message 
flow of EAP-TLS in a WLAN network. The AP creates a 
RADIUS Access Request using the supplicant’s identity 
and sends it to the AS.The AS then provides its certificate 
to the  supplicant and asks for the supplicant’s certificate. 
The supplicant provides its certificate to AS if the received 
AS’s certificate is valid. After the AS validates the 
supplicant’s certificate, it will send the result message 
RADIUS Access Success/Failure to deny or permit access 
to the network [3]. 
 
 
4. Proposed Protocol 
 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (D-H) is a cryptographic 
protocol that allows two parties that have no prior 
knowledge of each other to establish together a shared 
secret key over an insecure communications channel. Then 
they use this key to encrypt subsequent  communications 
using a symmetric-key cipher. The scheme was first 
published publicly by Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman in 1976. the Diffie- Hellman exchange by itself 
does not provide authentication of the communicating 
parties and is thus susceptible to a man-in-the-middle 
attack. An attacking person in the middle may establish 
two different Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, with the two 
members of the party "A" and "B", appearing as "A" to 
"B", and vice versa, allowing the attacker to decrypt (and 
read or store) then re-encrypt the messages passed 
between them. A method to authenticate the 
communicating parties to each other is generally needed to 
prevent this type of attack [2]. As shown in Figure.4, AS 
sends a request message to the BS that includes the 
certificate. Then the AS responds this message by sending 
(Cert BS,P(nonce),H(Ybs||f(nonce)) to A. Being a RSA 
encryption, P can encrypt nonce and User A can decrypt to 
receive nonce. 
 
 
Fig. 4 proposed protocol. 
 
Now, nonce is shared by MS and BS. And then, AS sends 
(Yms, H(Yms ||nonce)) to BS, BS calculates H '(YAS 
||nonce). If H '(YAS ||nonce) is equal to H(YAS ||nonce), BS 
believes this message sent by AS, or interrupts this 
communication. Similarly, AS calculates H '(YBS 
||f(nonce)) by YBS and from AS. If H '(YBS ||f(nonce)) is 
equal to H (YBS ||f(nonce)), AS believes this message sent 
by BS and calculates the K= (YA)XB mod q, or interrupts 
this communication. After A sends a massage H(nonce) as 
a confirmation signal to BS, AS and BS calculate the: 
 
AK= (YAS)XBS mod q=(YBS)XAS mod q       (1) 
5.  Threat analysis 
intercepts messages during the process of communication 
establishment or a public key exchange and then 
retransmits them, tampering the information contained in 
the messages, so that the two original parties still appear to 
be communicating with each other. In a man-in-the-middle 
attacks, the intruder uses a program that appears to be the 
(access point) AP to SS and appears to be the SS to AP. 
Denial of Service (DOS) attack is an incident in which a 
subscriber is deprived of the service of a resource they 
would normally expect to have. A considerable amount of 
denial of service attacks implement across the Internet by 
flooding the propagation medium with noise and forge 
messages. The victim is overwhelmed by the sheer volume 
of traffic, with either its network bandwidth or its 
computing power exhausted by the flood of information. 
Almost all the DOS vulnerabilities in Mobile wimax 
standard are due to unauthenticated or unencrypted 
management messages. We discussed these vulnerabilities 
in three processes: the initial network process, resource 
saving process and handover process[7]. eavesdropping of 
management messages is a critical threat for users and a 
major threat to a system. For example, an attacker could 
use this vulnerability to verify the presence of a victim at 
its location before perpetrating a crime. Additionally, it 
might be used by a competitor to map the network. 
Another major vulnerability is the encryption mode based 
on data encryption standard (DES). The 56 bit DES key is 
easily broken with modern computers by brute force 
attack. Furthermore, the DES encryption mode includes no 
message integrity or replay protection functionality and is 
thus vulnerable to active or replay attacks. The secure 
AES encryption mode should be preferred over DES. 
Eavesdropping mostly affects the transfer of information 
and rarely causes system outage. The assessment of the 
eavesdropping threat is minor to the system but high for 
the user [8] .in table.1 we show vulnerability for each 
method. the proposed authentication protocol has best 
function in comparison with other protocol. 
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6. Protocol Analysis by CPN 
We used a Petri net to model our security protocol. 
Colored Petri Nets (CP-nets or CPNs) is a graphical We 
used a Petri net to model our security protocol. 
Colored Petri Nets (CP-nets or CPNs) is a graphical 
language for constructing models of concurrent systems 
Table 1: Attack in authentication protocol. 
attack PKMv2(with nonce) EAP Proposed Protocol 
MITM About weak resistant resistant 
Replay About weak resistant resistant 
Interception resistant resistant resistant 
 
and  analysing their properties. CPnets is a discrete-event 
modeling language combining Petri nets and the 
functional programming language CPN ML which is 
based on Standard ML . A CPN model of a system 
describes the states of the system and the events 
(transitions) that can cause the system to change state. By 
making simulations of the CPN model, it is possible to 
investigate different scenarios and explore the behaviors 
of the system. Very often, the goal of simulation is to 
debug and investigate the system design. CP-nets can be 
simulated interactively or automatically[11]. Petri nets are 
composed from graphical symbols designating places 
(shown as circles), transitions (shown as rectangles), and 
directed arcs (shown as arrows). The Petri net model is 
illustrated in Figure 7. The model is simulated with the 
time color Petri net simulation tool. The basic information 
about the size of the state space and standard behavioral 
properties of the CPN model can be found in the state 
space report. For the CPN model of the proposed protocol 
in this study, the state space report is shown in Figure 6. 
As shown in Figure 6, we have data about "State Space 
statistics (Strongly-connected-component/Scc graph)", 
"Liveness Properties (Dead Markings, Dead Transition 
Instances, and Live Transition Instances)". The state space 
statistics inform about the size of the state space. For the 
model of proposed protocol, there are 11 nodes and 10 
arcs. If the nodes and arcs in the state space and Scc graph 
are equal, it means that there are no cycles in the model. 
The number of nodes and arcs in the state space and Scc 
graph of two protocols are equal. It means that the token 
will not fall in a loop, and we have finite-occurrence 
sequences.  A dead marking is a mark in which no element 
is enabled. This means that the marking corresponding to 
node 11 in Figure 7 is a dead marking. A transition is live 
if from any reachable marking we can always find an 
occurrence sequence containing the transition. As shown 
in Figure 6, there are no live transitions[10].Two protocols 
have a dead marking. So, they have not "live transitions". 
It is noted that no transition could be enabled from the 
dead marking. Also, there are no dead transitions in two 
protocols. A transition is dead, if there is no reachable 
marking in which it is enabled.There is no dead transition, 
which means that each transition in the protocol has the 
possibility to occur at least once. If a model has a dead 
transition, then it 
 
Fig. 6 state space report. 
 
corresponds to parts of the model that can never be 
activated. Hence, we can remove dead transitions from the 
model without changing the behavior of it. To compare the 
service delivery time of four protocols, we assume that 
each transition in two protocols takes 5 time units [10]. 
Several different kinds of output can be generated for data 
collector monitors. All of the data that is collected by a 
data collector can be saved in a data collector log file 
(Table.2).The log file also contains information about the  
steps and model times at which the data was collected 
[11]. 
 
Table 2: Timed static for propose protocol. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced a authentication protocol  
for Wimax network. The proposed protocol provides 
mutual authentication, key exchange between MS and BS, 
so the probability of some threats such as eavesdropping, 
MITM and replay is reduced. Also, we have compared the 
performance of proposed protocol with another protocols 
by using CPN Tools. It has been shown that by omission 
of some transactions, the number of place and transition 
are reduced. Also, the execution time is reduced 
significantly, and the network resources are reserved. The 
state space reports are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: state space statistic. 
property Pkmv2(RSA) EAP proposed 
Simulation step 7 13 10 
Model time 40 90 50 
Number of place 12 12 10 
Number of transition 5 9 5 
State space nodes 10 19 11 
State space arc 9 22 10 
Dead marking 20,21,22 6,19 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 petri net model for proposed protocol. 
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